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THE LECTURE NOTES OF ST. GEORGE TUCKER: A 
FRAMING ERA VIEW OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
David T. Hardy* 
Few if any legal figures in the early republic held the status of St. 
George Tucker.  Educated in the law by William and Mary‘s George 
Wythe, Tucker succeeded him as the College‘s professor of law, a post he 
held from 1790 until his appointment to the bench in 1804.1  While at Wil-
liam and Mary, he produced an edition of Blackstone‘s Commentaries,2 an-
notated in light of American law.  The text became ―the standard work on 
American law for a generation‖ and Tucker remained the most frequently 
cited American legal scholar for over two decades.3  Tucker‘s role in Amer-
ican legal scholarship was likewise striking.  He has been termed ―the first 
modern American law professor‖ and creator of the American law degree.4 
Tucker had exceptional opportunity to observe the legal events at the 
Founding.  His closest friend, John Page, and his brother Thomas Tucker 
served in the first House; they and others kept him informed, by correspon-
dence, of its events.5  He was temperamentally suited to analyze the Fram-
ing period.  His edition of the Commentaries was far from a reprint of the 
original; Tucker documented at length where the American States had re-
fused to adopt common law principles, and where the new Constitution and 





  J.D., University of Arizona 1975. 
1
  See generally Craig Evan Klafter, St. George Tucker: The First Modern American Law Professor, 
6 J. HIST. SOC. 133 (2006). 
2
  ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE‘S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE 
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1996) (1803) [herei-
nafter TUCKER‘S BLACKSTONE], available at http://www.constitution.org/tb/tb-0000.htm (link). 
3
  Paul Finkelman & David Cobin, Introduction to 1 TUCKER‘S BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at xii.   
4
  Klafter, supra note 1, at 133, 145–46.  Klafter identifies the American law degree as unique 
among common law jurisdictions in that its holder has received a broad education in the law and is ca-
pable of practicing without further training.  See id. at 145–46. 
5
  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 95 (Joseph Gales & W.W. Seaton eds., 1834) (Mar. 4 & Mar. 14, 1789), 
available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=001/llac001.db&recNum=51 
(listing Thomas Tucker and John Page as Congressmen from South Carolina and Virginia, respectively) 
(link); MARY HALDANE COLEMAN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER: CITIZEN OF NO MEAN CITY 35, 113–14 
(1938); see also CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS 293, 300 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) (providing examples of letters from Tho-
mas Tucker and John Page keeping St. George Tucker apprised of developments in the Congress). 
6
  See Klafter, supra note 1, at 142. 
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mon law as supra-personal and beyond improvement, Tucker delighted in 
documenting how Americans of his time had improved upon it and elimi-
nated its shortcomings.7 
Largely forgotten today, Tucker returned to some legal prominence last 
Term, when the majority in District of Columbia v. Heller8 cited his anno-
tated Blackstone‘s Commentaries as proof that the Second Amendment had 
originally been understood as an individual right to arms.9  The dissent also 
invoked Tucker‘s lecture notes to argue that, during the Framing period, he 
had seen it as a militia-related right of States.10 
Tucker taught his law students from extensive handwritten lecture 
notes, compiled in bound volumes.  His notes were preserved, and today are 
archived in the Tucker-Coleman Collection of the Earl Gregg Swem Li-
brary at the College of William and Mary.11  The following is a transcription 
of the portion dealing with the Bill of Rights, which follows Tucker‘s dis-
cussion of the limits placed upon Congress by Article I, Section 10.  The 
main text appears to date from 1791–92, with some marginal notes added 
later.12  Given his position and their dating, Tucker‘s notes are exceptional 
evidence of original public understanding and indispensible tools for origi-
nalist interpretation. 
Given contemporary adherence to originalist interpretation, and the li-
kelihood of future conflict—as demonstrated in Heller—between varieties 
of originalist analysis, dissemination of Tucker‘s hitherto unpublished lec-
ture notes13 may offer an important contextualization of the Bill of Rights 
during the Founding period.  It is my hope that working to democratize, as 





  See id. at 140–43. 
8
  128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
9
  Id. at 2805. 
10
  Id. at 2839 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The majority‘s response, id. at 2805 n.19, assumes that 
the passage quoted by the dissent is in fact Tucker‘s discussion of the Second Amendment.  In this both 
majority and dissent were misled.  See infra Part II. 
11
  Tucker‘s legal papers are presently being edited into a two-volume edition, due for publication in 
2011.  Omohundro Institute of Early American History & Culture, 
http://oieahc.wm.edu/tucker/index.html (link). 
12
  Tucker refers to the Bill of Rights as ratified, which places the notes at 1791 or later.  Earlier in 
his notes he devotes a lengthy discussion to whether the States may arm the militia if Congress failed to 
do so, a point mooted by enactment of the Militia Act of 1792, 1 Stat. 271.  St. George Tucker, Ten 
Notebooks of William and Mary Law Lectures 126–28 [hereinafter Tucker, Law Lectures] (unpublished 
Tucker-Coleman Papers, located at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and Mary) 
(copies on file with the Northwestern University Law Review).  But the marginal note at page 145 refers 
to the Alien Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 570, indicating that some such notes were later additions.  See infra 
note 34 and accompanying text. 
13
  I have located only two mentions of Tucker‘s lecture notes.  Professor Klafter refers to them in 
discussing Tucker‘s teaching technique, and quotes one paragraph.  Klafter, supra note 1, at 141–42 & 
nn.42–46.  Professor Cornell briefly discusses their relevance to the right to arms and quotes one para-
graph.  Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original Understandings and 
Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1129–30 (2006). 
103:272 (2008) The Lecture Notes of St. George Tucker 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/48/ 274 
legal analysis. 
In the following transcript, Tucker‘s words are italicized and indented. 
Indecipherable words are denoted by blanks, and probable but uncertain 
ones by brackets.  Tucker refers to the Amendments by their original num-
bering, identifying the First Amendment as the Third Article.  His original 
―footnotes‖ (actually written on the blank facing pages) are so identified.  
His pagination (which is consecutive throughout the books) is in brackets.  
For ease of access, I have prefaced Tucker‘s remarks with the relevant 
Amendment and, where salient, a brief introduction. 
Tucker begins by itemizing the restrictions upon Congressional power 
found in Article I, Section 10, and then turns to those imposed by the Bill of 
Rights. 
I. AMENDMENT I 
A. Religion 
Tucker takes a very robust view of freedom of religion and the Estab-
lishment Clause; separation of government and religion is indispensable to 
domestic tranquility.  The words he uses to describe the concept—‖[T]o 
separate them by mounds which can never be overleap‘d‖—resembles Jef-
ferson‘s later and more elegant invocation of ―a wall of separation between 
Church and State.‖14  Whether Jefferson took the metaphor from Tucker, 
with whom he was in frequent contact and considered among his ―earliest 
and best friends,‖15 will never be known.  It has been argued that a more 
likely source is the English Whig writer James Burgh, who referred to ―an 
impenetrable wall of separation between things sacred and civil.‖16  What-
ever the ancestry of Jefferson‘s words, Tucker‘s similar phrasing suggests 
that metaphors of this type were not uncommon at the time.  At the very 
least, we cannot regard Jefferson as an outlier, and thus cannot conclude 
that just a ―few Englishmen or Americans appear to have demanded separa-
tion of church and state during the late eighteenth century . . . .‖17 
 
[Page 140] 





  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins & Stephen S. Nelson (Jan. 
1, 1802), reprinted in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332 (Adrienne Koch 
& William Peden eds., 1944). 
15
  David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amend-
ment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 559, 612 (1986). 
16
  See DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN 
CHURCH AND STATE 81 (2002); ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS 
CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 83 (1996). 
17
  PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 59 (2002). 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/48/ 275 
portant restrictions on the legislative authority of the Federal government—
viz. 
8. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof. 
Our State bill of rights, art, 16, contains the following axiom—that religion, or 
the duty we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be dic-
tated only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.  In vain may the 
civil magistrate interpose the authority of human laws to produce that convic-
tion 
[P. 141] 
which human reason rejects: in vain may the secular arm be extended to real-
ize the fortunes denounced against unbelievers by all the various sectarists of 
the various denominations of religion throughout the world.  It is not in the 
power of human laws to convince though it18 to torture and to punish.  Hence 
the numberless persecutions, martyrdoms and massacres, which have stained 
the annals of mankind, from the first moment that civil and religious institu-
tions were blended together—To separate them by mounds which can never be 
overleap’d, is the only means by which the peace of mankind, and the genuine 
fruits of charity & fraternal love can be preserved.  This prohibition may 
therefore be considered as the [cement?] of government as well as the guaran-
tee of happiness to the individual.  See Acts of 1785 c, [2 or 3? 4].19 
B. Speech and Press 
The American concept of freedom of expression was, in Tucker‘s time, 
undergoing a transition.  Some held to the view that it went no further than 
prior restraint: writers took the risk of seditious libel prosecutions, or civil 
actions, once they were in print.  Others were beginning to see freedom of 
expression in a broader light, a view that did not really take hold until the 
Sedition Act of 1798.20 
Tucker is ahead of his time, taking a robust view of Americans‘ rights.  
Even in time of ―national struggles‖ limitations on freedom of expression 
are traps rather than benefits and marks of tyrannical tendencies; Tucker 
cites as illustrative Virginia‘s wartime limit on pro-British expression. 
Tucker‘s reference to freedom from exemption from ―coercion‖ brings to 





  ―Is‖ appears to be omitted here. 
19
  Most likely 24.  The Act to Establish Religious Freedom formed chapter 24 of the Virginia laws 
of 1785.  See An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1785), reprinted in 12 STATUTES AT LARGE; 
BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, 
IN THE YEAR 1619, at 84 (William W. Hening ed., 1823) [hereinafter HENING, LAWS OF VIRGINIA], 
available at http://www.vagenweb.org/hening/index.htm (link).  
20
  LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 104–32 (1999). 
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teenth-century academic is surprising modern: he seeks no ―clear and 
present danger‖ test, even in wartime.  While we cannot know how he 
would view modern issues such as obscenity, civil defamation, or political 
campaign regulation, his equation of freedom of thought with freedom of 
expression, and his repudiation of wartime Virginia statutes suggests that he 
would find the modern First Amendment tests, if anything, to be overly 
permissive of regulation. 
9. Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press.  
As human laws are incapable of producing conviction on the human mind, nei-
ther can they without violating the most important of human rights control the 
expression of whatsoever our reason dictates.  The liberty of speech in inse-
parable from liberty of thought.  Both are the immediate gift of the Creator, 
and are equally entitled to exemption from coercion by any earthly power. 
[P. 142] 
Restraints on the freedom of speech are the unequivocal marks of a tyrannical 
principle in government where they are imposed.—They have been resorted to 
in almost every nation, especially during the times of national struggles; but 
they are rather traps than fetters. 
[Tucker note: See the Acts of this Cwealth for punishing certain offenses Acts 
1776.  Ch :5.  “If any person residing within this Cw shall by any word, open 
deed, or act, [advisedly?] & [illegally or willingly?] defend the authority, ju-
risdiction or power of the king or parliament as heretofore claimed and expe-
rienced within this colony, or shall attribute any such authority to the king 
&c., the person offending, being legally convicted, shall be punished by fine & 
impr.  To be [assessed by?] a jury, so as the fine shall not exceed L 20,000, 
nor the imprisonment the term of five years.  See the [Little?] Rev. Code 40.] 
The freedom of the press, says our own State bill of rights, is one of the great-
est bulwarks of liberty & can never be restrained but by despotic govern’ts. 
Since the introduction of art of printing the rights of mankind, & the reasona-
ble limits of the powers of government, have been, if not better, at least more 
generally, understood than at any former period, since the commencement of 
human annals. [Tucker note: De Lolme [Jean de Lolme, The Rise and 
Progress of the English Constitution (1781)] considers the freedom of the 
press as a [censorial?] power actually residing in the people. [Pa?] 212.  The 
liberty of the press consists in this, that neither the courts of justice, nor any 
other [judges?] whatsoever, are authorized to [take notice?] of writings in-
tended for the press, [but] are confined to those which are  [actually?] printed 







  In modern terms, no prior restraint: a libel prosecution could only be brought after publication.  2 
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—In England, where the freedom of the press flourished more than in any part 
of Europe, the nation has consequently enjoyed a greater portion of freedom.  
In America, where the freedom of the press was still less restrained, we may 
venture to pronounce that the people, from that source alone, have so far as 
related to the internal administration of the government always enjoyed a 
greater portion of liberty, even before the revolution, than the ____ State itself.  
Since that period, our [enemies?] have endeavored to disseminate opinions 
that our liberty has become licentiousness.—This is a calumny which the 
peaceable demeanor of the people & the regular administration of justice, dai-
ly contradict and refute.  The liberty of the press, will I trust, secure to——
generations that portion of liberty which is now enjoyed among us, unsullied, 
undiminished, and unimpaired. 
C. Assembly and Petition for Redress of Grievances 
Tucker here argues the First Amendment‘s language is too narrow: the 
citizenry should be able, not only to petition, but to instruct, their legisla-
tors.  The right to instruct had been guaranteed in several State constitu-
tions, and in the First Congress, Tucker‘s brother Thomas proposed its 
addition to the Federal Bill of Rights.22 
[P. 143] 
10. The same article provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for 
the redress of grievances.  The bill of rights proposed by the Convention of 
Virga article 15 expresses that right in terms better adapted to the nature of a 
representative government, administered by the servants of the people & not 
by rulers who are their lords, by declaring, that the people have a right peace-
ably to assembled together to consult for their common good, or to instruct 
their representatives, and that every freeman has a right to petition or, or ap-
ply to the legislature for redress of grievances.  This is the language of a free 
people asserting their rights: the other [savors?] too much of that state of 
condescension observable in the acts of those rulers who affect to grant, what 
they cannot with-hold.  [Tucker note: In England it is provided by Statute 13 
Car: 2 c. 5 that no petition to the king or either house of parliament, for any 
alterations in church or state, shall be signed by above twenty persons, unless 
the matter thereof be approved by three justices of the peace, or the major part 
of the grand jury in the county—hence I presume arose the custom of grand ju-
ries presenting public grievances in this country.—The same statute declares 
that no petition shall be presented by more than [ten?] persons. 1 B.C. [Black-
stone’s Commentaries] 143.] 
II. AMENDMENT II 
The present controversy over the Second Amendment relates to wheth-
                                                                                                                           
JEAN LOUIS DE LOLME, THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, ch. 9 (1781).  
22
  AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 28–29 (1998). 
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er it protects a right to arms for individual purposes such as self-defense, or 
only a right to arms when serving in an organized militia. Last Term, in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court ruled for the former in-
terpretation. The Heller ruling was a narrow five-to-four. 
Tucker‘s lecture notes provide strong evidence for the Heller majority.  
He considers the right to arms the palladium (in eighteenth-century terms, 
the ultimate protection) of liberty and to be derived from the natural and in-
dividual right of self-defense. 
One wonders how the Stevens dissent in Heller could have argued, 
from these lecture notes, that ―St. George Tucker, on whom the Court relies 
heavily, did not consistently adhere to the position that the Amendment was 
designed to protect the ‗Blackstonian‘ self-defense right . . .‖ or that the 
notes suggest the Second ―Amendment should be understood in the context 
of the compromise over military power represented by the original Consti-
tution and the Second and Tenth Amendments.‖23 
The brief answer appears to be that the dissent relied uncritically on the 
portions of the lecture notes quoted by Saul Cornell in a 2006 article,24 
which the dissent cites as authority.25  The article sets out the quotations 
cited by the dissent and argues that they reflect Tucker‘s ―earliest formula-
tion of the meaning of the Second Amendment,‖ and ―casts the right to bear 
arms as a right of the states.‖26 
In fact, the article‘s quotations are misleading; they come from Tuck-
er‘s discussion of the militia clauses of the original Constitution, which 
predictably deal with military power and the States.  Tucker argues that the 
States have the power to arm their militias should Congress not do so since 
such power is not forbidden to States by the Constitution and hence is pro-
tected by the Tenth Amendment, just as any arms given would be protected 
by the Second Amendment.27  When, less than twenty pages later, Tucker 
does discuss the Bill of Rights, the language he uses closely parallels his 
1803 Blackstone‘s Commentaries, usually down to the word.28 
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed—this may 
be considered as the palladium of liberty.  The right of self defense is the first 
law of nature.  In most governments it has been the study of rulers to abridge 





  128 S. Ct. 2783, 2839 n.32 (2008). 
24
  Cornell, supra note 13. 
25
  128 S. Ct. at 2841. 
26
  Cornell, supra note 13, at 1130. 
27
  Tucker, Law Lectures, supra note 12, at 127–29. 
28
  E.g., Tucker‘s Blackstone begins its discussion of the Second Amendment with ―The right of self 
defence is the first law of nature: in most governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this right 
within the narrowest limits possible.  Wherever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already anni-
hilated, is on the brink of destruction.‖  Tucker then proceeds to a condemnation of the British game 
laws.  1 TUCKER‘S BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, app. note D, at 300. 
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the right of the people to bear arms is by any means or under any colour what-
soever prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated is in danger of being so.—
In England the people have been disarmed under the specious  
[p. 144]  
pretext of preserving the game.
29
  By the alluring idea, the landed aristocracy 
have been brought to side with the Court in a measure evidently calculated to 
check the effect of any ferment which the measures of government may pro-
duce in the minds of the people.——The Game laws are a [consolation?] for 
the government, a rattle for the gentry, and a rack for the nation. 
[Tucker note: In England the right of the people to bear arms is confined to 
protestants—and by the terms suitable to their condition & degree, the effect 
of the Declaration is entirely done away. Vi: Stat. 1 W & M l:2 c. 2.]
30
 
III. AMENDMENT III 
The Third Amendment is the ―nonstarter‖ of the Bill of Rights: in two 
centuries, precisely one case31 has had cause to seriously consider it (the suit 
failed on qualified immunity grounds, the Second Circuit finding that, un-
surprisingly, its dimensions were not clearly established).  Tucker is rather 
skeptical here, seeing the guarantee as evidencing a tolerance of standing 
armies. 
12. No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the 
consent of the owner; nor in time of war but in the manner prescribed by law. 
This clause by a kind of side wind seems to countenance the keeping up a 
standing army in time of peace; on which subject we have already offered 
some remarks.  It is calculated in some measure to lessen the burden of the 
___ to the individual, but by no means to add to the security of the nation. 
IV. AMENDMENT IV 
Tucker‘s understanding of the Fourth Amendment is interesting from a 
historical standpoint.  The Supreme Court has long considered the Amend-
ment‘s warrant requirement as a subset of reasonableness—that is, a war-





  Tucker‘s understanding of the British game laws was dated.  The Game Acts forbade all but ma-
jor landowners from hunting or owning tools that might be used for poaching.  The 1671 Game Act add-
ed firearms to that list, but they were deleted by the 1692 Game Act.  See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO 
KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 69–75, 125–26 (1994). 
30
  It is noteworthy that Tucker sees the Second Amendment as far more extensive than the British 
guarantee, whose qualifications in his eyes rendered it nugatory.  Tucker‘s favorite thesis is that, while 
American rights may have British common law origins, Americans‘ rights-consciousness has advanced 
far beyond them.  
31
  Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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even if probable cause existed.32  Professor Akhil Reed Amar has argued 
that the Fourth Amendment‘s warrant or probable cause requirement stems 
from the legal immunity given the person executing the search, protecting 
against the original strict liability for an unreasonable search.  Hence, prob-
able cause was originally intended only to apply to searches authorized by 
warrants; warrantless searches need only be ―reasonable.‖33  Tucker‘s dis-
cussion appears to be to the contrary, treating probable cause and warrant 
issuance as components of reasonableness. 
13. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers & ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated——
What shall be deemed unreasonable searches and seizures.  The same article 
informs us, by declaring, “that no warrant shall issue, but first, upon probable 
cause— 
[P. 145] 
which cause secondly, must be supplied by oath or affirmation; thirdly the 
warrant must particularly described the place to be searched; and fourthly—
the persons, or things to be seized.  All other searches or seizures, except such 
as are thus authorized, are therefore unreasonable and unconstitutional.  And 
herewith agrees our State bill of rights—Art. 10. 
[Tucker note: “vi: Act concerning aliens—contra 5: Cong: c:”34] 
The case of general warrants, under which term all warrants except such as 
are above described are included, was warmly agitated in England about thir-
ty years ago—and after much altercation they were finally pronounced to be 
illegal by the common law—see [Release?] of Money v. Leach 3 Burrow 1743. 
1 Bl. Rep: 555; vi ___ 4 B.C. 291. 
But this clause does not extend to repeal, or annul the common law principle 
that offenders may in certain cases be arrested, even without warrant.  As in 
the case of riots, or breaches of the peace committed within view of a Justice 
of the Peace, or other peace officer of a county, who may in such cases cause 
the offender to be apprehended, or arrest him, without warrant. 
Nor can it be construed to restrain the authority, which not only peace offic-
ers, but every private person possesses, by the common law, to arrest any felon 





  See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948). 
33
  AMAR, supra note 22, at 68–71. 
34
  In ―Of the Constitution of the United States,‖ note D to the appendix to his Blackstone, Tucker 
adds at this point an argument that the Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, (1798) (expired 1800), passed by 
the Fifth Congress, violates the Fourth Amendment.  See 1 TUCKER‘S BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, app. 
note D, at 301–04. 
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V. AMENDMENTS V, VI, VII 
A. Criminal Rights 
Tucker‘s discussion of the criminal aspects of these amendments is 
cursory.  He makes clear, however, that he feels the right to jury trial could 
bear expansion, to ensure that jurors are chosen from the vicinage rather 
than the State.  In the early Republic, this would have meant that a defen-
dant was essentially judged by jurors who knew him and the party bringing 
charges, and the reputation of both. 
14. The invaluable privilege of trial by jury is secured by the 7 & 8 articles of 
the Amendmts, concerning the antiquity and excellence of this mode of trial, 
[P. 146] 
as well in civil as in criminal cases. I shall for the present refer to 3 B.C. 349 
to 3_5—4 B.C. 349 to 364.— 
An objection however may be made that the 8th Article provides only for a tri-
al by a jury of the State & district wherein the crime is alleged to have been 
committed, instead of a jury of the vicinage, which term vicinage seems to imp-
ly in our State the county at large & not the immediate neighborhood—and I 
must confess that I am among the number of those who doubt the propriety of 
this departure from the strict common law principles. 
The common law maxim, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, 
more than once for the same offence, is rendered a fundamental law of the 
gov’t by the same article, as is also that other inestimable maxim of the com-
mon law, that no man should be compelled in any criminal case to give evi-
dence against himself.  That he shall moreover be informed of the nature & 
cause of the accusation, be confronted with the witnesses against him, and 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, & have the as-
sistance of counsel for his defence,—And that he shall in no case be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law—& herewith again 
agrees our own State bill of rights. 
The importance of all of these articles will more evidently appear, in the 
course of our examinations of the subjects to which they relate, in the fourth 
book of the Commentaries—I have enumerated them above only for the sake of 
method. 
15. The right of trial by jury in civil suits at common law is also [secured?] by 
the 9th article of the ratified amendments in all cases where the matter in con-
troversy should exceed the value of twenty dollars.  Here again I must refer the 
student to 3 B.C. 349 to 385. 
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B. Taking of Property 
Tucker interestingly ties the Fifth Amendment‘s takings clause to Re-
volutionary War impressments of supplies and equipment.  Supplying 
armed forces had long been a problem approached through the impressment 
power (Virginia statutes authorizing impressments date as far back as 
167735).  A 1781 statute authorized the governor to impress clothing, 
equipment, slaves, and horses for military use, adding that all property tak-
en shall be appraised by two neutral persons with a certificate given to the 
owners, and ―[a]ny person making impressment contrary hereto shall forfeit 
and pay double the value of the thing impressed.‖36 
Tucker‘s understanding of the purpose of the takings clause sheds at 
least some light on the issue raised in Kelo v. City of New London,37 relating 
to whether property may be taken for private but publicly beneficial use.  
The Virginia impressment statutes related solely to public use, and the ear-




17. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion.  Art: 7. 
This article is intended to restrain the arbitrary & oppressive measure of ob-
taining supplies by impress’t as were practiced during the last war, not infre-
quently without any compensation whatsoever.  A law of our own State, 
describes in what cases impress may be made, & by whom: and authorizes the 
commitment of the offender, in case of illegal impresses. 
VI. AMENDMENT VI 
Tucker, as with other rights related to criminal procedure, is cursory 
here.  One might suppose that his heart lay with the civil rather than the 






  An Act Restrayning the Impresse of Tymber, &c. (1677), reprinted in 2 HENING, LAWS OF 
VIRGINIA, supra note 19, at 415 (forbidding impressments of timber ―for the publique use or other pur-
pose, use, or intent‖).  A later statute authorized militia officers, called out to deal with invasion or insur-
rection, to impress boats, carts, digging implements, as well as sailors, blacksmiths and carpenters.  An 
Act for Making More Effectual Provision Against Invasions and Insurrections (1727), reprinted in 4 
HENING, LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 19, at 197. 
36
  An Act for Giving Certain Powers to the Governour and Council, and for Punishing Those Who 
Shall Oppose the Execution of Laws (1781), reprinted in 10 HENING, LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 19, 
at 413–16. 
37
  545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
38
  We break here with Tucker‘s sequence; in the original he discusses takings after discussing the 
Sixth Amendment.  See Tucker, Law Lectures, supra note 12, at 145–47.  
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16. Art:10 provides that excessive bail shall not be required; nor excessive 
fines imposed; nor cruel & unusual punishments inflicted. 
These restraints against oppression are well adapted to the nature of our gov-
ernment, and correspond exactly with the declaration contained in our own 
State bill of rights.  Art. 9. 
VII.  AMENDMENTS IX AND X 
Tucker‘s discussion of the Ninth Amendment stresses its importance.  
He displays admiration for Publius, the then-anonymous authors of The Fe-
deralist, but not for their position denying the necessity of a bill of rights.  
Tucker‘s justification of a bill of rights includes its explaining to every citi-
zen the nature of their rights, a consideration that underscores original pub-
lic meaning as an interpretative approach.  Tucker‘s treatment of the Tenth 
Amendment foreshadows later conflicts over Federal pre-emption, and the 
dormant Commerce Clause. 
18. The 11th Article declares that the enumeration in the Const. of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage other rights retained by the 
people. 
The want of a bill of rights was strongly, & with great energy & force of [rea-
soning?] [insisted on?] by the [opponents?] of the C.U.S. in its original form.  
The author of the letters signed  by Publius [roundly?] asserts that a bill of 
rights was not only unnecessary but would be dangerous.  His [reasoning?], 
as on most other points, is extremely ___ & acute, but by no means so convinc-
ing as many other parts of his letters.  A bill of rights may be considered in two 
points of view, first as giving law to the government to be established, & se-
condly, as giving information to the people.  The objection to a bill of rights in 
the former view would apply to every written constitution.  As to the second 
point, a bill of rights reduces to obvious fundamental maxims, [perceptible?] 
to every man of the commonest  
[P. 148] 
understanding, what can only be discovered in the consequence of learned & 
deep research & inquiries into the principles of [the laws?], without such 
aid.—I cannot therefore subscribe to the doctrine, ingenious as the [argu-
ment?] in favor of it must be acknowledged to be. 
The amendments proposed & ratified by the States are most of them such as 
would have formed the basis of a bill of rights—that they are not altogether 
[extensive enough?] will appear to them who will candidly examine those 
which were offered by this State, New York, North Carolina & Rhode Island, 
which I believe includes the whole that were offered by other States. 
19. Lastly, it is declared that the powers not delegated to the U.S. by the C. nor 
prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the 
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people.  Art: 12. 
This article has been thought liable to some objection from a degree of equi-
vocation in the use of the disjunctives, nor & or.  I have not [words crossed 
out] ___ ___ the objection.  But I should conclude the sense to be, that every 
necessary power of government, not prohibited to the States, may be exercised 
by the State governments, concurrently with the United States, or independent 
thereof according to the subject.  Now by the word prohibited in this article, I 
understand first, such powers as by the very terms of the Constitution are tak-
en away from the States expressly: such for example as that of coining money, 
as also the other powers enumerated in Art. I S. 10— 
[P. 149] 
Secondly, such as are in express terms granted to the United States, and are 
not in their nature susceptible of a concurrent authority in the individual 
States, such as the power to define or punish piracies & felonies committed on 
the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.  The right of creating & 
appointing to offices under the U.S.——All other powers necessarily springing 
from the very act of establishing a government, such as the powers of directing 
the course of inheritance, and of defining and punishing offenses agst. the so-
ciety, other than such as are [entrusted?] to the declarations to Congress & all 
others of a similar description, I apprehend are [secured?] to the States—such 
of them as are enumerated in the Constitution and are susceptible of a concur-
rent authority the States may possess in that manner.  Such of them as are not 
enumerated, they will [possess?] exclusively of the U.S.—Such powers as are 
neither enumerated in the Constitution of the U.S. nor in the State Constitu-
tions, nor necessarily spring from the act of establishing a government, I pre-
sume remain with the people, the original grantors of all the powers of 
government in those States. 
CONCLUSION 
Tucker‘s lecture notes give remarkable insight into how an American 
jurist and academic understood the Bill of Rights immediately after its rati-
fication.  Tucker agrees with Jefferson that the Establishment Clause erects 
a powerful barrier between church and state, a view the Supreme Court 
would not take until the Twentieth Century.  He sees freedom of expression 
as broadly, indeed absolutely, protected against federal interference, and as 
linked to freedom of thought.  Even in wartime, he sees suppression of dis-
sent or subversion as the path to tyranny, a view the Court would not take 





  Cf. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding conviction for distributing anti-draft 
leaflets during World War I); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (reversing conviction for 
advocating illegal behavior, but acknowledging that prosecution would be possible ―where such advoca-
cy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action‖). 
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Tucker views the Second Amendment as an individual right derived 
from the natural right of self defense, a position that the Court only ac-
cepted in 2008.40  And he describes the general Fourth Amendment reason-
ableness test as incorporating its warrant and probable cause requirements, 
a step not taken until 1948.41  Tucker‘s lecture notes, in brief, indicate that 
this Framing period scholar was astonishingly modern. 
Tucker‘s notes guide us toward an originalism that takes a very robust 
view of the Bill of Rights.  If he condemned measures against pro-British 
speech taken in the darkest days of the Revolution, it is hard to see how he 
would countenance modern ―hate crime‖ legislation, campaign limitations, 
or other restrictions upon expressive rights.  His derivation of the Fifth 
Amendment‘s takings clause from wartime impressment statutes is at least 
suggestive that he did not see it as permitting takings of property for private 





  District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008). 
41
  Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948). 
42
  Originalism‘s first major expositor was Professor Robert Bork, who saw it as a judicial restraint.  
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).  
More recent expositors, in particular Professor Randy Barnett, have seen it as a source for expansive 
readings of individual rights.  See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004). 
